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Alley: Some Aspects of Truth in Contemporary Philosophy

college of education

some aspects of truth in
contemporary philosophy
stephen L alley

the

author believes that the question what is truth
is
dearly basic to any educational philosophy which attempts to make
prescriptions for educational practice therefore he is concerned
to investigate some of the more important work done in this area
in recent years though not to do more than that not to attempt
an answer to that perennially disturbing and age old question
in this careful review of selected contemporary writings on the
philosophy of truth the author brings together several creative and
interesting points of view for comparison
mr alley received his undergraduate training at the university
of utah first in chemistry since then he has become interested in
educational administration and more recently in the philosophy of
education itself he is an instructor in the college of education at
brigham young university where his major interest is the concept
of truth as it applies to the aims of education

problem of truth has been with men since before pilate asked
christ what is truth plato based his doctrine on what he regarded as a fundamental distinction between doxa opinion and
teme certain knowledge to take a pair of wildly dissimilar
epis
episteme
epistome
examples the eleatics before plato and the medieval christians
long after him found themselves vitally concerned with the same
problem
modem science and the many schools
with the development of modern
of thought that turn upon it or claim alliance with it the statement
madei that the only rule to which the scientist has to subhas been made
mit is the specific system of logic and research which his culture
recognizes as the most valid this is the central contention of relativism and it is the logical outgrowth of the recognition described
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by ducasse that the ultimate criterion of truth is the individual s
own belief in the self evident truth of a proposition A distorted extension of this central statement is the biology of the russian lysenko now apparently discredited by his superiors which
was true relative to a marxist framework
As 1I L kandel has pointed out any discussion of the nature of
the state leads inevitably to some evaluation some assessment of
values and ends of political life and to a consideration of the ways
in which education is directed to their attainment to what purpose
is illiteracy eradicated in a country unless the eradication is accompanied by an effort to cultivate judgment in the choice of what to

read

from the inevitability of the assessment of values follows the
necessary inclusion of an examination of the nature of truth if
truth is completely relative then the culture pattern and the nature
of the state both are antecedent to and take precedence over truth
the deliberate manipulation of education by those in control of the
state with regard only for the purposes of the state must then be
declared2 that the relaregarded as justifiable robert ulich has declared2
tivist danger of dissolving everything in indecision and irreverence
it might be added worse still of subverting the ideal of freedom
of thought cannot be overcome by denying the obvious fact that
man is indeed a creature of contingency and that nearly all human
activities are modified by the culture pattern we would not he says
ever escape from relativism if it meant merely the admission that
man depends to a high degree on his environment physically mentally and morally the way out lies in the courageous admission
that there are vision faith and purpose in human life as well as
just actuality man transcends his environment as well as exists
within it
koyak truth is spirit and freedom it
koyrk
koyre
in the words of alexander koyne
is not a secure possession of mankind every generation as well as
every individual must win it for itself through its own exertion
the task is a difficult one in which the object must be kept in view
re
reexamination of our notion
hence the need for a frequent critical examination
of truth
the purpose of this paper is to achieve a measurement of clarification of the general notion of truth by reviewing and comparing
some of the writings in contemporary philosophy on the subject
within its scope it is hardly possible of course to review the liter
ibad
ibid
ibld
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acture
ature completely

the material presented is a selection from a more
comprehensive research project
1I

TRUTH AND MEANING

that

truth and meaning are not the same may be demonstrated
easily and simply by considering to take an example from the current literature the sentence there are six species of animals on
mars 3 each of the words in the sentence is meaningful for they are
correctly arranged grammatically but the truth or falsity of the
sentence is not established nor at least at present can it be it may
be asked what a sentence means if its truth or falsity cannot be
established the logical positivists of the viennese circle answered
the question by saying it means nothing but that would not rob
the present example of meaning they would say because only practical difficulties ie our inability to get to mars to count the species of animals stand in the way of its being verified it is in principle at least verifiable and therefore meaningful
this positivist criterion of meaning as mcmurrin states it may
be formulated thus all cognitively meaningful sentences ie sentences which are either true or false are either formal as is the case
with the propositions of logic and mathematics which are either
tautologous or contradictory and are without factual reference or
they are empirical being capable in principle of experiential test
and thus assert something about matters of fact 4
moritz schlick the leader of the viennese positivist circle put
the matter this way
vay whenever we ask about a sentence what
does it mean
what we expect is instruction as to the circumstances
in which the sentence is to be used we want a description of the conditions under which the sentence will form a true proposition and
of those which will make it false this description is the meaning
and it is then determined by a set of rules which regulate the use of
a word or combination of words these rules schlick says are the
grammar in its widest
rules of the grammar of the words using grammar
possible sense 5
froni this statement is that we must
the conclusion to be drawn from
ultimately refer to ostensive definitions which of course means reference to experience or possibility of verification in schlick s
schlick points out
terms before we can understand any meaning
that the appellation experimental theory of meaning often ap
11

randall and buchler
jarrett and mcmurrin
schlick
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plied to the view just expressed is a misnomer for it is no set of
theoretical hypotheses but a simple statement
professor C 1I lewis has voiced6
voiced one objection to this criterion
when he pointed out that if it is maintained that no issue is meaningful unless it can be put to the test of decisive verification which
cannot take place except in the immediately present experience of
the subject nothing can be meant except what is actually present
in the experience in which that meaning is entertained
schlick s reply is that the conclusion does not follow from lewis
premises because the first premise assures us that the issue has
meaning if it can be verified verification does not have to take
place verification is a process like hearing or feeling bored and
the sentence verification can take place only in present experience is nonsensical because it cannot possibly describe a fact further schlick asserts that propositions about future events can be
verified by simply waiting for the events to happen
waiting is
a perfectly legitimate method of verification
dalkey has indicated that one objection to the empirical criterion of meaning ECM is based upon a misunderstanding of it
the objection states that it is necessary to know the meaning of a
sentence in order to determine whether or not it is verifiable or
whether or not it is meaningful dalkey says that the ECM sets up
a logical equivalence between being meaningful and being verifiable
there is no question of before and after again dalkey says it is
simply not the case that if a person knows the meaning of a sentence he thereby knows directly whether or not it is meaningful
dalkey points out the difference between knowing the meaning
kn
knowino
of a sentence and knowing
knowing
to know
owino whether it is meaningful
the meaning of a sentence is to know how to use it correctly ie
such social skill in word usage
in a socially acceptable manner
does not he says entail a recognition of the cognitive value of the
sentence
he suggests that a more expedient method of constructing a criterion of meaning would result from dealing with the way in which
words are given a usage rather than by using the rather troublea term which he says involves several
some term verifiable
psychological and sociological puzzles which are irrelevant to the
design of a criterion of meaning the method makes use of the
simple device of choosing a set of words which are obviously mean
lewis

dalkey

10
5
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inggul
ingful in the sense in which we are interested and saying that any
other term is meaningful if it has the proper relation to one or more
of these touchstone words which are those which can be learned
on the basis of direct experience
this is the method used by schlick and also by carnap in his
article testability and meaning
norman dalkey points out that the success a criterion achieves
in making the language a more efficient instrument will determine
the final choice of the criterion he opens another field for discussion when he suggests that vagueness might not be a degenerate
state of language it may be useful and even essential and dalkey
points to the necessary vagueness of terms used to describe quantum
mechanics
another case in point is the law of disorder of probability as treated by george gamow in some of his popular writings according to dalkey the unkempt word may keep our meanings warmer than the precisely tailored one
for different aims
we might expect different criteria to be appropriate this seems to
be the case with respect to the criteria used for the natural languages ie natural as opposed to the systematic language in
which the parts of a theory are expressed in the natural languages
and in the varying uses to which they are put we have of course
varying degrees of meaningfulness a virtual continuum as dalkey
says there seems to be no particular point in drawing a line across
the series and saying that beyond this knife edge lies the darkness
of utter nonsense
felix kaufmann observes that certain considerations lead us
straight to the issues of the relations among meaning and verification and verifiability in positivistic doctrines it has been duly
emphasized that philosophy cannot legislate to science by prescribing
rules of scientific procedure which are purportedly established by
pure intuitive reason as self evident truths the rules of scientific
procedure are established rather by the pragmatic nature of science
itself the criticized view has its chief root in the failure to distinguish sharply between deductive logic in the strict sense and the
logic of scientific procedure proof by pure reason ie clarification
of the meaning of propositional
prepositional functions is a way of justifying
logical rules a way not applicable to the rules of empirical procedure as hume has shown nor is it correct to say kaufmann continues that the rules of procedure made explicit by such analyses as
hume s are descriptive of the actual procedure of the scientist
kaufmann

8
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rather these rules are the criteria in terms of which scientists

dis-

tinguish between correct and incorrect scientific decisions scientists
seek of course to comply with these rules but more or less frequent
aberrations leave their validity untouched the important point is
their recognition as standards of criticism
the issue according to kaufmann is this on the one hand the
meaning of a synthetic proposition is not logically prior to the criteria of its verification in the sense that these could be deduced
from the meaning if this were so kaufmann writes we could indeed establish the rules of verification on ultimate grounds as we
can the rules of the syllogism on the other hand meaning is certainly in a sense prior to verification or verifiability in asking
whether it is correct to accept a proposition we consider that proposition as given we cannot formulate a problem of verification
without referring to the meaning to which the verification relates
naturally the question arises how are meanings given kaufmann admits that this question indeed indicates profound problems
the problems of the constitution of meanings and he refers the
reader to husserl s later phenomenological works for the treatment
of them but he insists such problems have no place in methodology where objective meanings are presupposed as already constituted
what matters is not the meaning of meaning but a
sharp distinction between problems that are exclusively concerned
with meaning
11
II

TRUTH AND

verification

in his article kaufmann briefly examines the meaning of truth
as related to scientific procedure truth and falsity he says are
taken in traditional logic to be properties of propositions each of
which possesses one and only one of the two truth values true and
false
this view of course is that of aristotle who declared
that only such sentences are propositions as have in them either truth
or falsity de interpretations
interpretatione 1I 4 to verify a proposition must
mean according to this view to acquire the knowledge of its truth
to falsify it must mean to acquire knowledge of its falsity of
course our knowledge of these properties does not establish them
they are independent of our knowledge this seems at first
glance to explain why logic can analyze the truth relations between
synthetic propositions without examining whether they are true
closer analysis however reveals that the so called truth relations
between synthetic propositions are not concerned at all with their
28
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truth or falsity but merely with internal relations logical inclusion
or exclusion of propositional meanings ie of restrictions of the
frame of probabilities irrespective of any actualization
such recognition of the proper function of truth relations of
synthetic propositions seems vital to the validity of scientific procedure
in discussing the issue of whether truth is to be defined in
terms of scientific procedure kaufmann criticizes the realists for
their confusion of the terms logical independence
or dependence
and causal independence
or dependence
it is
absurd to maintain the realists would argue that truth should depend on knowledge eg that kepler s laws of planetary movements should not have been true before kepler formulated them
the argument at first sight isis convincing says kaufmann but it
does not prove that the meaning of truth is logically independent of the meaning of verification instead it only shows that the
historical fact of accomplished verification is not among the truth
conditions ie the criteria of possible verification
kaufmann illuminates his point further by referring to a situation where the occurrence of an event may causally depend upon
whether it had been predicted and further upon whether such prediction may have been warranted such a situation might be the
influencing of the price of a commodity by a prediction and an explanation of the factors on which the prediction had been founded
thus the truth of the conceivable prediction may causally depend
upon whether it was actually made and substantiated if we understand by its truth its confirmation by actual observation but
writes kaufmann if we understand truth in this way we have
established the observational test as a truth condition
ie we
have defined truth in terms of this test and then we cannot say
that the fact that the prediction has been actually made and warranted is a truth condition for it we shall be more ready kaufmann thinks to recognize that truth is not unrelated to verifiability and hence to rules of scientific procedure when we have disposed
of the ambiguities that lie in the prevailing confusion between matters of fact and relations of meanings
statement
from the argument that a sta
tenient is true or false irrespective
of time it seems to follow that truth and falsity have a logical
structure fundamentally different from that of verification and falsifi
sification
cation respectively and cannot therefore be defined in terms of
them doubting the conclusiveness of the argument kaufmann
29
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can we really say that true and verified are fundamentally
different concepts would not this imply that the idea that science

asks

aims at finding truths is altogether erroneous and is it essential
for a true proposition to be able to withstand all controls
in order to dispose of the paradox which arises as a result of the
foregoing discussion kaufmann proposes the following definitions
we mean by a true proposition one that could be accepted if we
had all possible knowledge which is relevant in terms of the rules
of procedure for the decision whether it can be accepted and that
once accepted could withstand all possible controls
in such a
definition the concept of truth is related to an idealized potential
process of verification the belief that propositions can be found
which would be able to withstand all possible control is the belief
in truth it can be neither ultimately confirmed nor ultimately refuted yet kaufmann cautions if the doctrine of skepticism pretends to have refuted the belief in truth because of its stress on the
impossibility of ultimate confirmation it is wrong and furthermore
it is wrong if related to analytic propositions
pap
in a chapter on empirical knowledge and certainty arthur papa
pap9
summarizes the views of those philosophers mainly followers of
wittgenstein who maintain that the fallibilist thesis of the inevitable uncertainty of all empirical knowledge is trivial
pap thinks that the proper question to be addressed to the fal
libi lists is this
libilists
just under which conditions would 1I have conclusive evidence for my empirical belief
if the fallibilist should
give the probable reply however numerous the tests may be by
which you partially verified your belief there is always further empirical evidence that is relevant to its truth or falsity he would
only be saying in another way pap points out that a complete verification of an empirical proposition would involve an infinite prouse pap s example every historical event propgram of testing
agates effects throughout an infinite future and every such future
effect is relevant to the truth or falsity of the statement that the
event actually occurred thus we come to the conclusion that if
certain means completely verified again the fallibilist principle
is unassailable on account of being definitional but it is trivial to
say that a never ending process never ends
pap s discussion emphasizing as it does that the problems to be
solved are problems of definition and analysis is clarifying but
pap insists that thus locating the problems is not to say that the fal

to

pap

12
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libi lists have made a trivial point although it is true that the proplibilists
osition no empirical statement is conclusively verifiable is either
false or else analytic it is still a worthy achievement to articulate
the sense of conclusively verifiable in which the proposition is
analytic because thereby one clarifies the difference between an empirical statement and a logico
lodico mathematical statement
anbach
enbach 10 truth is the idealization of a weight of
reichenbach
for hans reich
high degree using the concept of weight in its probabilistic statistical sense such a concept follows developmentally from C S
peirce who considered truth to be the concordance of an abstract
statement with an ideal limit towards which endless investigation
peirce envisaged the endwould tend to bring scientific belief
less investigation being undertaken by a community of scientists
who would know full well that the investigation would be endless
and that the limit permitting the concordance would be ideal but
who would continue their efforts in the cheerful hope that they
would meet with success anyhow a rather apt description of the
present state of science and philosophy
reichenbach asserts flatly that there are no propositions at all
which can be verified earlier in the same work he has postulated
three predicates of propositions meaning truth value and weight
and he
be has identified one apparent difference between truth value
and weight the difference is this whether a sentence is true depends on the sentence alone or rather on the facts concerned the
weight on the contrary is conferred upon a sentence by the state of
our knowledge and may therefore vary according to a change in
knowledge
truth value therefore is an absolute predicate of
propositions and weight a relative predicate
analyzing the presupposition that propositions about concrete
physical facts which he calls observation propositions are absol utely verifiable he shows that this conception is untenable and
solutely
that even for such statements only a weight can be determined
statements concerning impressions impression propositions are
likewise shown to be incapable of absolute verification and also to be
judged only by the category of weight thus there are left no propositions
osit ions at all which can be absolutely verified
and thus the predicate of truth value of a proposition is a mere fictive quality all
propositions are indirect and never exactly verifiable the predicate
of weight entirely supersedes
supercedes that of truth value it remains our
only measure for judging propositions our speaking of the truth
I1

reichenbach

14

31

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1976

9

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 4

value of a proposition is only a schematization because we regard
a high weight as equivalent to truth and a low weight as equivalent
to falsehood the intermediate domain is called indeterminate
the conception of science as a system of true propositions reichenbach firmly avers is nothing but a schematization
lie
lle
he reminds us is a useful approximation but
this conception ile
like all approximations is permissable
permissible
per missable only within a certain domain
s tenio logical inquiry it will
of application thus for a careful epi
epistemological
not do at all and leads to grave incongruity with the actual situation furthermore in the hands of what reichenbach calls pretentious
schematization
atlon has produced
tent ious and consistent logicians this scheniatiz
serious misunderstandings of science and has led to grave distortions
in the interpretations of scientific methods it has also been abused
reichenbach claims as a support for a radical misinterpretation of
the very nature of science
reichenbach thinks his description applies to the positivist criterion of meaning see section 1I supra which makes meaning dependent on verifiability so long as the demand of verifiability is
over strained pap insists on the same condition when he emphanot overstrained
sizes the importance of verifiable in principle
that is so long
as a highly probable proposition is considered as true the positivistic theory is useful
but with the introduction of higher pretension into the methods of analysis a great number of the propositions of science are pointed out as unverifiable the positivistic theory
of meaning then expels these propositions from the domain of
meaning and substitutes for them other sentences which for any
unprejudiced eye cannot perform the functions of the condemned
propositions
reichenbach remarks the fact that although this procedure is
carried through with more or less consistency none of its representatives
senta tives has had the courage as yet to carry his principle through
to its ultimate consequence and to admit that there are no meaningful sentences at all left in science
it was to escape such criticism leveled at them by reichenbach
that schlick and others of the positivists modified their earlier extreme position the positivistic theory of meaning emphasizing that
meaningful statements are in principle verifiable approaches the
probabilistic theory of meaning of reichenbach in which verification is to denote only the determination of a degree of probability
kaufmann agrees with reichenbach on the matter saying that
knowledge whether perfect or imperfect as to invariable truth of
32
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synthetic propositions is unobtainable not because of the limitations
of human knowledge but because the conception of such knowledge involves a contradiction in terms
rudolf carnap has made a distinction between truth and perfect
knowledge in an argument which is presented elsewhere in detail 11
reichenbach kaufmann and neurath all infer from the impossibi
sibility
lity of absolute certainty that the semantical concept of truth
should be abandoned this inference says carnap presupposes this
premise A term predicate must be rejected if it is such that we
can never decide with absolute certainty for any given instance
whether or not the term applies but not even reichenbach kaufmann or neurath believe this carnap advances in its place another
premise according to which true is likewise a legitimate scientific
term
carnap would thus preserve the distinction between true and
confirmed probably reserving for the latter the meaning estimated as true by X at time t he declares that the confusion of
true with confirmed has been brought about because it has
been considered altogether impossible to establish an exact and consistent definition of truth in its customary meaning
he points
out too that this confusion leads to the necessary abandonment
of the principle of the excluded middle which maintains for every
statement that either it or its negation is true
carnap1212 makes the distinction more explicit
in another article Carnap
and refers to the semantic concept of truth to make his meaning
clearer he insists in opposition to kaufmann that we must distinguish between true on the one hand and known to be true
warranted as assertverified
established
highly confirmed
ible etc on the other
the concept variously expressed by the
latter phrases and similar ones may imply truth but it is not identical
with truth
he says the semantical concept of truth has nothing
to do with the idea of perfect knowledge or absolute certainty he
quotes kaufmann
there is no domain of legitimate application
for a general concept of truth which would encompass a logical
implication b warranted assertibility and c total coherence
or even any two of these terms
going beyond kaufmann carnap says emphatically that the semantic concept of truth does not
although
concepts
cepts
encompass any one of these three con
though his statement
cents al
seems unclear as it applies to logical implication the truth of a sentence means simply that the facts are as described in the sentence
11

carnap
12
carnap

4 p

120 ff

3
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whether anybody knows it or not the question as to how we are to
find out whether the facts are as described is a different matter this
question is to be answered by statingb criteria of confirmation
carnap agrees with kaufmann that the use of the concept of
truth is not necessary however helpful either in deductive or in
inductive logic because the basic concepts of these two fields
logical implication and degree of confirmation respectively I can
be defined without referring to truth kaufmann prefers to avoid
the concept of truth in logic in order to preserve the conceptual
purity of deductive logic carnap does not object but indicates that
he feels there is no compelling reason for requiring others to follow the same ascetic procedure if they feel the use of the concept
would be convenient
ernst nagel13
nagel objects to the definition of true proposition by
kaufmann which has been set forth above the objections of
nagel are threefold
1
it is not clear how kaufmann can establish the necessary
truth of the principle of excluded middle and other logical principles if true is specified in terms of acceptability carnap above
pointed out that the confusion of true with confirmed has led
to essentially the same result the abandonment of the principle
2
the acceptability of a proposition for kaufmann is always
relative to a system of rules of procedure it follows that whether
a given proposition is true or not depends on what system of rules
are implicitly presupposed in instituting controls for it Is a proposition true nagel asks relative to a thomist set of controls even
if it is false relative to the controls of modern science
3
the truth of a proposition is specified in terms of the completion of a theoretically endless process accordingly truth is
simply an ideal of inquiry and a synthetic proposition can never be
established as true but nagel like G E moore accepts the point
where S is any proposition logically entails
that 1 I know S
S is true
this may be seen from the fact that if S is not true
then one does not know S
in consequence nagel says if professor kaufmann were right in his contention that a synthetic proposition can never be established as true we would never know anything 14 to propose that we know something with probability in
the view of nagel is to propose a new usage for the verb to know
1

13nagel
nagel

dr

11

israel scheffler thinks that this does not necessarily follow because the
moore nagel entailment above does not imply the following one 1 I know S therefor S is now established as true

34
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arthur

pap
pap15 joins nagel and carnap in desiring to keep a place

for the semantical concept of truth why he asks should one
conclude from the fact that it is always possible to doubt whether
a given concept applies in a given case that the concept is illegitimate or inadmissible

lil
ill

111
III

the

THE SEMANTIC CONCEPT OF TRUTH
logician alfred tarski attempts to form a definition of

truth which will be formally correct and materially adequate the
conditions governing the formation of the definition may be outlined thus
1
it is most convenient to apply the term true to sentences
we must always relate the notion of truth to a specific language
for it is obvious that the same expression which is a true expression
in one language can be false or meaningless in another this does
not exclude the possibility of the extension of the term to other objjects
ects
acts

the

definition should comprehend and conform to other
notions of truth such as 1 the aristotelean definition to say
of what is that it is not or of what is not that it is is false while
to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not is true
2 the correspondence theory that the truth of a sentence consists
in its agreement with or correspondence to reality 3 the concept of designation which is that a sentence is true if it designates
an existing state of affairs
tarski s criteria of the material adequacy of a definition are 1 1
the sentence snow is white is true if and only if snow is white
in general this schema T X is true if and only if p is called an
2 we shall call a definition of
equivalence of the form T
truth adequate if all equivalences of the form T follow from
it it should be emphasized that neither the expression T itself
which is not a sentence but only the schema of a sentence nor any
particular instance of the form T can be regarded as a definition
of truth the name the semantic conception of truth is proposed
by tarski for the conception which has been outlined
tarski is quick to point out that the problem of the definition of
true obtains a precise meaning and can be solved in a rigorous way
only for those languages whose structure has been exactly specified
for other languages thus for all natural or spoken languages
2

11

pap

tarski

12

p 355
16

35
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the meaning of the problem is more or less vague and its solution
can have only an approximate character
in order to discuss the structure of the specified language tarski advances the elemental notions of the object language and the
meta language the object language is the language which is
ineta
metalanguage
talked about the definition of truth applies to the sentences of
this language the metalanguage
meta language is that in which we talk about
the first language and in terms of which we wish to construct the
definition of truth for the first language if we wish to talk about
our metalanguage
meta language we must go to a higher metalanguage
meta
meia language and thus
we arrive at a whole hierarchy of languages
cannabrava17
euryale Canna
euryalo
brava differs sharply from tarski and all others
cannabrava
who assert an involvement of truth with language or context he
says bluntly that truth is simply objectivity disclosed in the formal
structure of a relational implication as well as in any correct description of a state of affairs it is independent of any linguistic
or contextual meaning
he is markedly impatient with american philosophers who attempt to replace his objectivity with any sort of subjective definition he is especially scornful of those who use symbolic logic to
give the appearance of truth to what is actually wishful thinking
at its worst
he thinks that to say for instance that scientific
statements are right in so far as they are agreed upon by competent
observers must be considered an absurd proposition in spite of our
ability to reinforce it by the appearance of consistency and logical
truth no symbolic device he says can change a foolish statement
into a sound one
Canna brava s voice is a lone one
but cannabrava
the notions of designation and satisfaction are helpful in furthering the clarification of the semantic concept of truth pap
out that it is possible to know what an expression designates
points out18
without knowing whether a given sentence containing the expression
is true but on the other hand it is impossible to determine the
truth value of a sentence without knowing what its constituent expressions
pres sions mean this then is the reason why the concept of truth
semantically defined logically presupposes the fundamental semantic
concept of designation
satisfaction is a relation between arbitrary objects and certain
given objects satisfy a
expressions called sentential functions
given function if the latter becomes a true sentence when we replace
Canna
brava 2
cannabrava
op dt
cit pp
ap 347
348
347348

36
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in it free variables by names of given objects eg
X is white is
a sentential function satisfied by snow since the sentence snow is

white is true
concerning the declaration of pap that it is impossible to determine the truth value of a sentence without knowing what its constituent expressions mean scheffler has observed that it may be
be says if P and Q are significant expressions
wrong for he
and if 1 IP is true then the sentence
or Q is true is true and
we can determine this without knowing what the constituents of Q
designate the declaration of pap holds true in this case only if
scheffler s example is regarded as a molecular sentence to be broken
into its atomic parts of which the sentence Q is true is one
considering the notions of designation and satisfaction together with tarski s criteria we arrive at tarski s definition of truth
it appears that for sentences only two cases are possible a sentence
is satisfied either by all objects or by no objects thus tarski defines
truth and falsehood simply by saying that a sentence is true if it is
satisfied by all objects and false otherwise
A summary of the semantic concept of truth includes the following points
1
the structure of the language inevitably influences the sense
in which truth is used
2
assumptions leading to contradictory sentences must be examined this point may be illustrated by the antinomy of the liar
which tarski thinks it dangerous to treat as a joke or as a sophistry
here is the antinomy
1
the sentence written here is not true S
S is true if and only if the above sentence is not true ac2
cording to the schema T
3
thus S is true if and only if S is not true
twogeneraltwo
the assumptions leading to the contradiction are in general
fold 1 1 the language in which the antinomy is constructed contains in addition to its expressions the names of those expressions
as well as semantic terms such as the term true referring to sentences of this language we have also assumed that all sentences
which determine the adequate usage of this term can be asserted in
the language A language with these properties is called by tarski
2
in this language the ordinary laws of
semantically closed
logic hold
3
the semantic conception of truth thus comes to this in pap s
terms
p is true is synonymous with the simple assertion of p

7
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thus to

say it is true that horowitz is a great pianist is the same as
is a great pianist and to say of this propoasserting that horowitz is
sition that it is false is to assert its denial horowitz is not a great
pianist
again we could assert the semantic conception of truth as
an equivalence for every p p is true if and only if p

IV LOGICAL TRUTH
A J pap has observed that logically truths are only practically
irrefutable by experience in the sense that when reconciling prediction and observation means abandoning a logical principle the
price is too high this may be seen from pap s example in which
the supposition is made that we abandon the logical principle any
statement which is implied by true premisses
pre misses is true because in a
given case a conclusion derived from premisses
pre misses firmly believed to
be true turned out to contradict observed facts
A J ayer s empiricism10
empiricism10 is representative of that which rests
upon purely logical considerations he makes it clear in calling
himself an empiricist that he is not avowing a belief in any of the
psychological doctrines commonly associated with empiricism holding that even if these docrtines were valid their validity would be
independent of the validity of any philosophical thesis and could
be established only by observation he attempts to deal with the objection that is commonly brought against all forms of empiricism
namely that it is impossible to account for necessary truths on
purely empiricist principles in so doing he presses the point that
every consistent empiricist must accept the principle that all propositions not only general propositions which deal with factual content are at best only probably hypotheses and that none can ever become logically certain the point has already been discussed above
and need not be elaborated here except to remark that ayer adds
that the fact that the validity of a proposition cannot be logically
guaranteed in no way entails that it is irrational for us to believe it
on the contrary what is irrational is to look for a guarantee where
none can be forthcoming to demand certainty where probability is
all that is obtainable
ayer cites hume s conclusive demonstration already alluded to
above that no general proposition whose validity is subject to the
test of actual experience can ever be logically certain for the fact
that an empirical law has been substantiated in n 1 cases affords no
logical guarantee that it will be substantiated in the nth case also
ayer

1
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no matter how large we may take n to be ayer remarks that there
is nothing perverse or paradoxical about the view that the truths
of science and common sense are hypotheses and consequently the
fact chat
that empiricism involves this view constitutes no objection to it
ayer admits that where the empiricist does encounter difficulty
is in connection with the truths of formal logic and mathematics
because no proposition which has a factual content can be necessary
or certain if empiricism is correct the empiricist must deal with
the necessary and certain truths of logic and mathematics in one of
the two following ways he must say either that they are not necessary truths in which case he must account for the universal conviction that they are or he must say that they have no factual content and then he must explain how a proposition which is empty
of all factual content can be true and useful and surprising
having phrased the problem so ayer declares that the empiricist if neither of the two courses prove satisfactory must give
giv
div e way
to rationalism and admit that there are some
truths about the world
sometruths
which we can know independently of experience that there are
some properties which we can ascribe to all objects even though
we cannot conceivably observe that all objects have them we shall
have to accept it as a mysterious and inexplicable fact ayer says if
the empiricist cannot solve his problem that our thought has this
power to reveal to us authoritatively the nature of objects which
we have never observed or else we shall have to accept the kantian
explanation which only pushes the mystery a stage further back
in attempting to make good the empiricist insistence that there
are no truths of reason which refer to matters of fact ayer rejects mill s contention that the propositions of logic and mathematics
have the same status as empirical hypotheses or that their validity
is determined in the same way he maintains instead that they
are independent of experience in the sense that they do not owe
their validity to empirical verification
ayer makes these additional points 1 the terms true and
false connote nothing but function in the sentence simply as
marks of assertion and denial and in that case there can be no
2 there is
sense in asking us to analyze the concept of truth
then no problem of truth as it is ordinarily conceived the tradit
ditional
ional conception of truth as a real quality is due like most
philosophical mistakes to the failure to analyze sentences correctly
3 no synthetic proposition which is not purely ostensive can be
logically indubitable but we cannot admit that any synthetic proposition can be purely ostensive 4 the preceding point must follow
39
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from the fact that one cannot in language point to an object without describing it
2
wilbur M urban20
urban declares in direct opposition to ayer s
position that the tacit assumption underlying all meaningful discourse is that the terms true and false do connote something it
is also the presupposition of such discourse that truth connotes correspondence in some sense and to some degree the classical conception of truth he writes that the dialectic of meaning leads to the
conception of the primacy of truth but the notion of truth when
examined exhibits a simil
ar dialectic which appears to lead to the
similar
notion of the primacy of meaning by a dialectic immanent in the
truth notion it outruns its primary meaning and the notion of
truth becomes subordinated to that of meaning one way of avoiding
this situation is to deny the necessity of giving any meaning to the
truth notion the way taken by ayer and a position popular with
the logical positivists
urban admits that the ayer thesis is psychologically understandable
stan dable yet he denies the possibility of maintaining such a thesis
it is understandable through this reasoning if the meaning of any
word is in reference to a sensuously observable entity then the word
truth which of course has no such reference is meaningless except emotively it is but the natural consequence of extreme nominalism which as urban quotes dewey makes non
sense of all
nonsense
our meanings surely writes urban no one would make the assertion of the ayer thesis unless he believed it to be true and truth
thus applied must have some connotation
it is just as certain that
if 1I do not accept this assertion as true as 1I certainly do not that
the one who makes it is bound to tell me what he means by truth
here otherwise all argument comes to an end and his assertion
is dialectically meaningless
I1
admitting that the copy theory or correspondence theory of
truth has been greatly criticized urban uses it to advance his general argument insisting that if it is not the final notion correspondence
pon dence is still the initial notion of truth and this notion sets in
play a dialectic of truth which is significant for the general problem

V conclusion
C J ducasse 21 in attempting to define the ultimate criterion
of truth calls attention to the fact that the mind seems to arrive
urban
2ducasse
ducasse
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at a point where it must accept willingly or not the ultimate recognition of truth as an individual value judgment this is highly
unsatisfactory seeming to lead to complete relativism yet no way
out seems possible in setting up criteria by which truth may be
evaluated the mind must recognize the validity of the criteria if
secondary criteria are set up the final step of recognition of validity
has only been postponed
descartes was guided by what seemed indubitably clear to his
mind peirce in demolishing descartes view demonstrated at the
same time its truth in his own acceptance of his own ideas in these
times ducasse has propounded the cartesian criterion he explicitly
asserts that self evidence is the ultimate criterion of truth
in this paper the author has no wish to read into contemporary
writings similarities which do not exist nor to minimize essential
differences however a close study of the few works that have
been reviewed reveals that many of the differences are superficial
and exist in the structure of language rather than in thought that
is many of the difficulties seem to be semantic rather than logical
most contemporary
contemporay philosophers are reluctant to approach the study
of the concept of truth from a single viewpoint empiricists acknowledge the place of intuition in the acquisition of knowledge
though using their own terminology and calling it as einstein did
a fact of experience rationalists are ready to incorporate into their
own thinking empirical contributions the analyses through the
emphasis they have placed on language have focused attention on
meanings and the necessity to strip language of its ambiguities
the whole enterprise the passionate striving after truth has
taken on the character of peirce s cooperative enterprise by a community of philosophers actuated by the cheerful hope its history
has been described by helmut kuhn 22 it was in setting out to its
boldest venture the quest of the ideal of the good that the human
chanced upon the boundaries of knowledge which cirintellect
donl
doni
wisdom
cum scribe human or finite wis
cumscribe
its future must be that of a
process of constant check and correction by its own nature the
search for truth is self corrective
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